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Abstract. This paper studies a model of optimal redistribution policies in which agents
face unemployment risk and in which savings may provide partial self-insurance. Moral
hazard arises as job search e®ort is unobservable. The optimal redistribution policies
provide new insights into how an unemployment insurance scheme should be designed:
First, the unemployment insurance policy is recursive in an agent's wealth level, and
thus independent of the duration of the unemployment spell. Second, the level of bene¯t
payments is negatively related to the agent's asset position. The reason behind the latter
result is twofold; in addition to the ¯rst-order insurance e®ect of wealth, an increase in
non-labor income (wealth) ampli¯es the opportunity cost of employment and thus reduces
the agent's incentive to search for a job.
During unemployment the agent decumulates assets and the sequence of bene¯t pay-
ments is observationally increasing - a result that stands in sharp contrast with previous
studies.
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1. Introduction
Between the ages of 18 and 40, an American worker can expect to be unemployed on
¯ve di®erent occasions.1 An average spell of unemployment lasts for approximately three
months. Unsurprisingly then, unemployment is perceived as one of the greatest economic
risks an individual faces during her working life, and insurance against such shortfalls in
labor income is of high importance. Whereas most modern economies provide unemploy-
ment insurance through a governmentally sponsored unemployment bene¯ts programme,2
several empirical studies suggest that this is not the only source of insurance available to
the unemployed. Of the total fraction of unemployed eligible for bene¯ts, Blank and Card
(1991) estimate that only 67% take up unemployment insurance, indicating that many of
the unemployed ¯nd insurance elsewhere. Among the group of participating individuals,
Gruber (1997) ¯nds that the consumption smoothing e®ect of insurance is particularly high
at late stages of the unemployment spell, arguing that this occurs when ¯nancial wealth
is depleted. Lastly, Gruber (1998) shows that unemployment bene¯ts have a signi¯cant
crowding-out e®ect on savings, not only suggesting that unemployment bene¯ts and wealth
act as close substitutes, but also that savings is an important factor to consider when
designing an unemployment bene¯ts programme.
Motivated by these issues, this paper is develops a theoretical model in order to charac-
terize an optimal unemployment bene¯t programme in the presence of moral hazard and
partial self-insurance. An in¯nitely lived individual can at any date either be employed or
unemployed. While working she faces an idiosyncratic exogenous risk of losing her job, and
while unemployed she can devote time and e®ort to search for a new job. The agent enjoys
consumption and leisure, and she may reallocate resources intertemporally by means of a
riskless asset. A utilitarian government provides unemployment insurance. It has informa-
tion on the agents' consumption level and preferences, but not on their search e®ort. The
government's redistribution policy must therefore be incentive compatible.
In this setting, the government has full control over the agent's consumption and search
e®ort allocations, and may thus choose these directly. Allowing the government to choose
allocations, rather than policies, simpli¯es the problem considerably. However, it also forces
1According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 (NLSY79).
2As unemployment insurance reduces the opportunity cost of employment, it evokes substantial moral
hazard e®ects in the labor market (Meyer, 1990; Mo±tt, 1985). Private insurance solutions are thus unlikely
to function e±ciently, and may even fail to exist. As a consequence, most modern economies relies exclusively
on a governmentally funded unemployment insurance programme (Oswald, 1986; Chiu and Karni, 1998).ASSET BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 3
the analysis to proceed in two separate steps: The ¯rst step characterizes the optimal alloca-
tions while the second implements these allocations through a tax system in a decentralized
economy.
I show that the government's intertemporal ¯rst order condition must observe an inverse
Euler equation (Rogerson, 1985). By Jensen's inequality, this optimality condition implies
a wedge between the agent's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the economy-
wide interest rate (the marginal rate of transformation). Said di®erently, in relation to
a frictionless economy, the agent is saving constrained. The reason behind this result is
straightforward: In order to provide incentives to exert search e®ort, the government wishes
to generate a positive correlation between consumption and employment. When the agent's
utility function is concave, higher savings weakens this correlation and thus decreases search
e®ort. Thus, at an optimal programme, a crowding-out e®ect of unemployment insurance
on savings is indeed desired.
Following recent developments in the dynamic public ¯nance literature, I construct tax
(or policy-) functions that implement the optimal allocations in a decentralized economy
(cf. Kocherlakota (2005); Albanesi and Sleet (2006); and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006)).
By implement, I mean a tax system such that the solution to a decentralized maximization
problem faced by an individual agent that takes the tax system as given, coincides with
the government's optimal solution. The resulting tax functions are simple: Current taxes
depend solely on the agent's current and previous employment state, and on her level of as-
sets. These tax functions provide new insights into how an optimal unemployment insurance
scheme should be designed: First, the unemployment insurance policy is time-invariant, and
thus independent of the duration of the unemployment spell. Second, unemployment bene¯t
payments relate negatively to the agent's asset position: In addition to the ¯rst-order insur-
ance e®ect of wealth, a ceteris paribus increase in non-labor income (wealth) ampli¯es the
opportunity cost of employment and thus reduces the agent's incentive to search for a job.
Moreover, during unemployment the agent decumulates assets and the sequence of bene¯t
payments is observationally increasing - a result that stands in sharp contrast with previous
studies (e.g. Shavell and Weiss, 1979; Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997; Pavoni, 2007; Pavoni
and Violante, 2007).
The essential economic mechanisms in this paper are closest related to those in Shavell
and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and Pavoni (2007). In their seminal
study, Shavell and Weiss (1979) show that consumption ought to be decreasing with respect
to the duration of the unemployment spell, a result further con¯rmed and strengthened in4 PONTUS RENDAHL
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Pavoni (2007).3 Since these studies abstract from
savings, the policy recommendation is immediate; unemployment bene¯ts are given as the
di®erence between consumption and labor income, and should therefore decrease along
the duration of the unemployment spell. I deviate from this literature by relaxing two
assumptions: Firstly, I model employment and unemployment as recurrent states, while
previous studies have assumed that employment is an absorbing state. Secondly - and more
importantly - I allow for partial self-insurance by means of a riskless asset. This has salient
implications for the optimal unemployment bene¯t policy. While the consumption pattern
largely remains unaltered, the bene¯t policy does not.
In order identify the e®ect of savings and bene¯t payments on consumption, I rely on re-
cent developments in the dynamic public ¯nance literature. Following Kocherlakota (2005)
and Albanesi and Sleet (2006), I consider tax systems that resemble modern economies'
combined usage of taxes and markets to reallocate resources in the economy. Kocherlakota
(2005) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006) consider dynamic versions of Mirrleesian taxation
(Mirrlees, 1971); concisely, a utilitarian government wishes to allocate resources in an econ-
omy where skills are unobservable, but labor income is not. Although the economy explored
in this paper functions under fundamentally di®erent informational frictions, the proxim-
ity of some results should be noted. As in both Kocherlakota (2005) and Albanesi and
Sleet (2006), (wealth-) taxes and marginal taxes are period-by-period expected to be zero.
Moreover, whereas Kocherlakota (2005) puts no restrictions on the process governing the
evolution of agents' skills, the resulting tax system admits a complex structure in which the
tax in any period depends upon the full history of past labor income reports. In contrast,
Albanesi and Sleet (2006) assume that the evolution of agents' skills are identically and in-
dependently distributed over time, and show that the tax system lends itself to a recursive
representation in the agents' wealth. Although the evolution of employment status in this
paper is endogenous and exhibits high persistence, the tax system admits a simple recursive
representation in the agents' wealth and current employment status transition.
In a recent paper, Shimer and Werning (2005) consider a problem closely related to
the question explored in this paper. Similar to this paper, Shimer and Werning (2005)
¯rst consider the optimal allocations, and then, by proving an equivalence result, derive
the decentralized policy that implements these allocation . However, the two papers show
considerable di®erences: Shimer and Werning (2005) consider a version of McCall's (1970)
search model with hidden reservation wages. This paper considers hidden search e®ort
3In fact, Pavoni (2007) ¯nds that consumption should be non-increasing: By exogenously imposing a
minimum lower bound on the agent's present value utility - a constraint that may be interpreted as a
minimum subsistence level - the consumption sequence embeds a °at pro¯le whenever this constraint is
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decisions. More importantly, all qualitative properties explored in Shimer and Werning
(2005) hinges on the assumption of CARA utility, and thus on potentially negative con-
sumption levels.4 Abstracting from some standard regulatory conditions, this paper puts
no restrictions on the speci¯c functional form of the agents' momentary utility function.
2. Structure of the economy
The economy is populated by a utilitarian government and a continuum of risk-averse
agents. The planning horizon is in¯nite. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0;1;::: In any
given period t, an agent can either be employed or unemployed and the agent's employment
status is publicly observable.
When an agent is employed, she earns a gross wage, w. There is no on-the-job search
and the probability of losing the job is exogenously given at the constant hazard rate 1¡°.
When unemployed, the agent receives unemployment bene¯ts and searches for a job with
e®ort e. The probability of ¯nding a job, conditional on search e®ort, is denoted p(e). Search
e®ort - and thus the probability of ¯nding a job - is considered private information, not
observable by the government or by any other agent in the economy.5 The wage distribution
is degenerate, and a job o®er is, consequently, always accepted. The agents can save using
a riskless bond that pays net pre-tax return equal to r > 0. The intertemporal price of
consumption, 1=(1 + r), is denoted by q. Savings are publicly observable.
2.1. Model. Formally, employment status in any period t is given by µt 2 £ = f0;1g.
Let µt = 1 denote employment. The history of employment status up to period t is given
by µt = (µ0;:::;µt) 2 £t, where £t = f0;1g £ f0;1g £ ::: £ f0;1g, represent all possible
histories up to period t.
At time zero, each agent is born as either employed or unemployed, and she is entitled
some level of initial cash-on-hand, b0. The initial entitlement/employment status-pair,
(b0;µ0), is taken as given by each agent in the economy (the government included). The
joint distribution of (b0;µ0) is given by Ã(b0;µ0), with support on B £ £, where B is some
subset of the real numbers, B µ R. Thus, at every date, t, each agent is distinguished by
her initial entitlements and history of employment status, (b0;µt).
Without any loss of generality, I will henceforth formulate the problem such the agents
choose p - the probability of ¯nding a job -, rather than e®ort e, directly. The agent then
ranks contemporaneous consumption and search e®ort allocations according an additively
4In Shimer and Werning (2005) it is shown that their results do not extend to a setting with CRRA
utility.
5This is the source of moral hazard in the model; if bene¯t payments would be made contingent upon
search e®ort, the economy would reach its ¯rst best allocation.6 PONTUS RENDAHL
separable felicity function, fu(c) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)v(p)g. There is no disutility from working.6 The
function u and v are strictly increasing and once continuously di®erentiable. In addition,
u is strictly concave and v is strictly convex. The standard Inada conditions apply for u;
u0(0) = 1 and limc!1 u0(c) = 0.
An allocation in this economy is denoted ¾ = fct;ptg1
t=0, where
ct : B £ £t ! R+
pt : B £ £t ! [0;1]
Here, ct(b0;µt) is the amount of consumption an (b0;µ0)-agent is assigned under history
µt. The contemporaneous probability of ¯nding a job, pt(b0;µt), is de¯ned equivalently.
Let ¸(b0;µt+1) denote the probability measure for history µt+1, conditional on (b0;µ0). For




pt(b0;µt)¸(b0;µt); µt+1 = 1
(1 ¡ pt(b0;µt))¸(b0;µt); µt+1 = 0







fu(ct(b0;µt)) ¡ (1 ¡ µt)v(pt(b0;µt))g¸(b0;µt)dµt (1)
The utilitarian government wishes to ¯nd ¾ that maximizes the sum of net present value
utilities












fct(b0;µt) ¡ µtwg¸(b0;µt)dµt; 8 (b0;µ0) 2 B £ £ (3)
Furthermore, since the search e®ort allocation is private information, the optimal allocation
must also respect incentive compatibility
fptg1
t=0 = argmaxfV (¾;b0;µ0)g; 8 (b0;µ0) 2 B £ £ (4)
The motivation behind the incentive compatibility constraint is simple: Each agent takes the
consumption allocation as given and chooses search e®ort to maximize her private utility.
Without any loss of generality, the problem is organized such that the government directly
proposes a search e®ort allocation that coincides with the agent's private optimal choice.
Constraint (3) ensures feasibility. It should be noted that this constraint will always
hold as an equality; if it did not, the government could simply increase the agent's period
6Including disutility from working would not change any of the results in the paper.ASSET BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 7
zero consumption without in°icting with incentive compatibility. An allocation that is both
incentive compatible and feasible will be referred to as incentive feasible.
Note that in (3), q is the constant intertemporal price equal to 1=(1+r). Implicitly, this
assumes that there exist an exogenous ¯nancial sector, willing to borrow and lend at the
intertemporal price q.
The following lemma states that maximizing (1) subject to individual incentive compat-
ibility and feasibility, is equal to solving the more complicated problem given in (2). The
result is standard and the proof is merely included for completeness.
Lemma 1. De¯ne ¾¤ as the allocation that maximizes (1) for each (b0;µ0) 2 B££, subject
to individual incentive compatibility and feasibility. De¯ne ^ ¾¤ as the allocation that solves
(2). Then




Proof. By construction, ^ V (Ã) ¸
R
B££ V (¾¤;b0;µ0)dÃ. If the inequality was strict, then
there exist some (b0;µ0) such that V (^ ¾¤;b0;µ0) > V (¾¤;b0;µ0). Since ^ ¾¤ is incentive
compatible and delivers b0, ¾¤ could not have attained the maximum in (1). ¤
2.2. A recursive formulation. Following the insights provided by Lemma 1, the problem
of interest is given by







fu(ct(b0;µt)) ¡ (1 ¡ µt)v(pt(b0;µt))g¸(b0;µt)dµt (5)
s.t. fptg1







fct(b0;µt) ¡ µtwg¸(b0;µt)dµt (7)
Under an optimal allocation, ¾¤, equations (5) and (7) can be written as
V (b0;µ0) = u(c¤










The following lemma asserts that, given the budget b¤(µ1), re-optimizing the problem in
period one, does not alter period zero present value utility.
Lemma 2. V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) maximizes the agent's utility subject to the budget b¤(µ1) and
incentive compatibility. That is, V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) = V (b¤(µ1);µ1).
Proof. See Appendix A. ¤8 PONTUS RENDAHL
The result is not trivial. If V (b¤(µ1);µ1) > V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) for at least one µ1, period zero
incentive compatibility is violated. The idea behind the proof lies in the fact that V (b0;µ0)
is strictly increasing in b0, and that b¤(µ1) must therefore be resource minimizing given
utility V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1). The Inada conditions on u then guarantees that duality holds:
If b¤(µ1) is resource minimizing under utility V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1), V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) must be
utility maximizing under the budget b¤(µ1).
Let be and bu denote period t + 1 contingent claims in the employed and unemployed
state, respectively. Then - by exploiting the insights provided by Lemma 2 and following
the arguments outlined in Spear and Srivastava (1987) - problem (5) can be made recursive
as
V (b;µ) = max
c;p;be;bu
fu(c) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (be) + (1 ¡ p)V (bu))g (10)
subject to
p = argmaxpfu(c) ¡ µv(p) + ¯(pV (be) + (1 ¡ p)V (bu))g (11)
and
b = c ¡ µw + q(pbe + (1 ¡ p)bu) (12)
Since the function v is di®erentiable and strictly convex, the incentive compatibility con-
straint (11) can be replaced by its ¯rst order condition
v0(p) = ¯(V (be) ¡ V (bu))
The solution to (10)-(12) yields a value function, V (b;µ), associated with policy functions
c(b;µ), p(b;µ), be(b;µ) and bu(b;µ). When there is no confusion regarding the agent's em-
ployment status, the policy functions will be addressed by their respective initial letter, and
reliance on b will be left implicit.
Previous studies on optimal unemployment insurance adopt a dual formulation to the
problem in (10)-(12). Speci¯cally, the literature has, without exception, followed the cost-
minimization framework commonly employed in the repeated-agency literature. Fundamen-
tally, this approach amounts to minimize (3) such that the agent receives a pre-speci¯ed level
of present value utility, and subject to incentive compatibility. Due to Spear and Srivastava
(1987), this dual formulation lends itself straightforwardly to a recursive representation. In
contrast, this paper adopts a primal approach. The reason for this is twofold: First, the
primal formulation simpli¯es the subsequent analysis and provides an intuitive recursive
representation in terms of (non-labor) cash-on-hand, b. Second, this way of formulating the
problem has a quite appealing and natural interpretation: Akin to a social planner, the
government maximizes the agent's utility by choosing current consumption, search e®ort,
and one period ahead Arrow securities at prices qp and q(1 ¡ p). By respecting incentiveASSET BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 9
compatibility, moral hazard is internalized through individually and quantity contingently
priced assets.
3. Analysis
Consistent with the formulation of the problem in (10), the government chooses allo-
cations rather than policies. While it facilitates the analysis of the governments optimal
policy problem, it also restricts the subsequent analysis to proceed in two separate steps.
The ¯rst step concerns the optimal allocations. The second step considers the tax functions
that implement these allocations in a decentralized bond economy.
Although the two steps presented above may appear distinctly separate, they are, in
e®ect, intimately related. Thus, as a third step, Section 3.3 will show how the shape of the
derived tax functions are closely tied to the incentive compatibility constraint, and how a
quite esoteric optimality condition, commonly known as the inverse Euler equation, relate
to a more familiar form of the standard Euler equation.
3.1. Allocations. Analogous to the de¯nition of be and bu, let ce and cu denote period
t+1 consumption at the associated employment states. During employment, moral hazard









When ¯ = q, condition (14) implies that consumption is constant for any two consecutive
periods; on a period-by-period basis, the agent is fully insured.















¹v00(p) = ¸q(be ¡ bu) (16)
¹
¸









Where ¸ and ¹ are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget- and the incentive compatibility
constraint, respectively.
Equation (15) is commonly known as the \inverse Euler equation" (Rogerson, 1985).




(pu0(ce) + (1 ¡ p)u0(cu)) (18)
Rearranging terms, equation (18) infers that there is a wedge between the agent's marginal
rate of substitution and the economy's marginal rate of transformation. In particular,
(18) implies that current marginal utility of consumption is lower than the expected future10 PONTUS RENDAHL
marginal utility. In other words, the agent is savings constrained relative to an economy
with no private information. Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) interpret this
wedge as an \implicit tax".
According to the standard Euler equation, an optimal intertemporal plan has the property
that any marginal, temporary and feasible change in behavior equates marginal bene¯ts to
marginal costs in the present and in the future. The inverse Euler equation appears to violate
this logic. For a given value of p, consider the choice of reallocating resources from period t
to period t+1. If an increase in savings would bring about a proportional increase in be as
well as bu, equation (18) reveals that, at least on the margin, such a policy would increase
overall utility. However, the incentive compatibility constraint in (11) does generally not
permit a proportional increase in be and bu. To keep the choice of p unaltered, the incentive
compatibility constraint forces the increase in resources to be relatively low in future states
where the marginal utility of resources is relatively high, and vice versa. Period t + 1
marginal utilities will thus be \weighted" by their respective incentive compatible in°ow of
state contingent resources. In contrast, utility maximization implies relatively high weights
of resource in°ow to states in which the marginal bene¯t of resources is relatively high.
Since incentive compatibility in°icts with period t + 1 resources only, it is thus optimal to
relegate a high degree of resources to period t consumption. As a result, the agent appears
savings constrained. The inverse Euler equation is simply the resulting expression when
these con°icting forces are internalized. Section 3.3 will more algebraically con¯rm the
validity of this interpretation of the inverse Euler equation.
Lemma 3. If V (b;µ) is concave and q = ¯, then
(i) ce(b;0) > c(b;0) > cu(b;0).
(ii) c(b;1) > c(b;0).
(iii) b > bu(b;0) > be(b;0) and bu(b;1) > b = be(b;1).
Proof. (i) Assume that cu(b;0) ¸ ce(b;0). Then from equation (16), be(b;0) ¸ bu(b;0).
From (15) it is immediate that c 2 (ce;cu) and thus that bu(b;0) ¸ b. By concavity of
V , c(b;µ) is non-decreasing, and thus c(b;0) ¸ ce(b;0) ¸ c(b;1), where the last inequality
follows from be(b;0) ¸ bu(b;0) ¸ b. When µ = 1, we have that b = be(b;1). Moreover, since
c(b;0) ¸ c(b;1) = cu(b;1), b ¸ bu(b;1). Collecting inequalities yield
be(b;0) ¸ bu(b;0) ¸ b = be(b;1) ¸ bu(b;1)
From the budget constraint, and using the fact that w > 0, this implies that c(b;1) > c(b;0),
which contradicts c(b;1) · c(b;0). Since c(b;1) · c(b;0) was a corollary of cu(b;0) ¸ ce(b;0),
we must have cu(b;0) < ce(b;0).
Claims (ii) and (iii) are immediate consequences of the proof of (i). ¤ASSET BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 11
The mechanisms underlying the proof can be seen from equation (16), in which the utility
gain/cost from a marginal increase in p is equalized. If cu > ce, the left-hand side in equation
(16) states the utility gained through a marginal increase in p. It is a gain since a small
increase in ce, accompanied with a decrease in cu, attains the marginal change in the right-
hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint (11) necessary to accompany the change
in p. Such a change provides more insurance and thus increases utility. However, due to
interiority, there is an associated utility cost; be must be larger than bu, and an increase
in p thus increase the share of the budget spent on period t + 1 resources. The proof then
proceeds by showing that cu > ce together with bu < be, cannot be budget feasible since
the wage when employed is strictly positive.
In a two period setting, the terms be and bu in equation (16) may be replaced by ce ¡ w
and cu, respectively. The intuition behind the result in Lemma 3 is then straightforward:
To provide incentives to exert search e®ort, the government generates a positive correlation
between employment and consumption, ce > cu. Insurance is provided by a low intertem-
poral variance, ce > c > cu. Concavity then ensures that this logic extends to a setting
with an in¯nite planning horizon.
Remarks. The notion of Lemma 3 is equivalent to Proposition 1 in Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997). The proof is however substantially di®erent: Here, employment is not an absorbing
state and the problem is primal rather than dual.
In Lemma 3, concavity of V (b;µ) is assumed.7 The assumption is common in the literature
and is indispensable for the analysis (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997; Ljungqvist and Sargent,
2004). The di±culty in proving concavity lies in the fact that the choice set in (10) is not
necessarily convex, and that (functions of) some choice variables does not enter the Bellman
equation additively.8
Previous studies on optimal unemployment insurance abstract from self-insurance (e.g.
Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Pavoni (2007)). In the
absence of savings, the policy implication from Lemma 3 is lucid; the tax/subsidy policy
is de¯ned as the di®erence between consumption and labor income, and bene¯t payments
should therefore decrease along the duration of an unemployment spell. While Lemma 3
7Indeed, conditions (14)-(16) are derived using Benveniste and Scheinkman's (1979) envelope theorem -
a theorem that requires concavity.
8Note that these are su±cient, but not necessary conditions for concavity. All numerical solutions in, for
instance, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) display a strictly concave value
function (or, equivalently, a strictly convex cost function).12 PONTUS RENDAHL
reveals that the consumption pattern remains unaltered in the current setting with self-
insurance, the unemployment bene¯t policy does not: Most theoretical models of self-
insurance (e.g. Aiyagari (1994)) display a decreasing consumption pro¯le even in the absence
of any unemployment bene¯t programme. It is thus the aim of the subsequent section to
characterize the policy that can implement the optimal allocations in an economy with
self-insurance.
3.2. Decentralization.
3.2.1. A ¯scal implementation. The previous section characterized the constrained Pareto-
optimal allocations attainable in the economy. This section will demonstrate how these
allocations may be attained in a setting in which the agents choose consumption, search
e®ort, and savings, taking the government's policy as given. The ultimate task of this
section is thus to ¯nd the tax policy such that the agents' private choices corresponds to
the optimal allocations derived above.
The agents in the decentralized economy have access to a riskless bond, a, that pays net
(pre-tax) return equal to r. At time zero, the agents enter a market economy with a given
level of cash-on-hand equal to b0. For a given tax policy, the agents maximize their utility by
choosing consumption, savings, and search processes that ful¯ll their intertemporal budget
constraint. If there is a one-to-one correspondence between the chosen processes and the
optimal allocation, ¾¤, the tax allocation is called a ¯scal implementation of ¾¤.
Formally,
De¯nition 1. Let b0 = a0 ¡ T0 be given. If there exist a tax allocation ^ T = fTtg1
t=0,
Tt : £t £ Rt ! R, such that fct;at+1;ptg1
t=0 solves








fu(ct(b0;µt)) ¡ (1 ¡ µt)v(pt(b0;µt))g¸(b0;µt)dµt (19)
subject to
wµt + at(b0;µt¡1) ¡ Tt(µt;a(b0;µt)) = ct(b0;µt) + qat+1(b0;µt) for t = 0;1;::: (20)
and fct;ptg1
t=0 equals the optimal allocation ¾¤, then ^ T is said to be a ¯scal implemen-
tation of ¾¤.
Note that the tax allocation has a very general form. Taxes in any period t may depend
on the full history of employment as well on the full history of asset positions. To the extent
that an optimal allocation depend on the complete employment history, the reason for the
former is straightforward. The motivation behind the latter is less obvious; since the agents
choose t + 1 assets using information available up to period t, it is plausible to conjecture
that taxes in t + 1 will themselves only depend on information available up to period t.ASSET BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 13
However, as shown by Kocherlakota (2005), this intuition may fail; when actions are hidden
there might not exist a ¯scal implementation limited to this information set.
The following proposition shows that a ¯scal implementation exists and that the resulting
tax functions are simple: The tax level is recursive and contingent on the agent's current
transition and her level of wealth.
Proposition 1. There exist a time invariant tax function, Tt = T(at;µt;µt¡1), that imple-
ments ¾¤.
Proof. The proof is direct and establishes a one-to-one relationship between the govern-
ment's and the agent's problem.
By Bellman's Principle of Optimality, the government's problem in (10)-(12) can be split
up as
V (b;µ) = max
c;³
fu(c) + X(³;µ)g
s.t. b = c ¡ µw + q³
X(³;µ) = max
p;be;bu
f¡(1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (be) + (1 ¡ p)V (bu))g
s.t. v0(p) = ¯(V (be) ¡ V (bu))
³ = pbe + (1 ¡ p)bu




f¡(1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (³ ¡ Te(³;µ)) + (1 ¡ p)V (³ ¡ Tu(³;µ)))g
Thus,
V (b;µ) = max
c;³
fu(c) + max
p f¡(1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (³ ¡ Te(³;µ)) + (1 ¡ p)V (³ ¡ Tu(³;µ)))gg
= max
c;³;p
fu(c) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (³ ¡ Te(³;µ)) + (1 ¡ p)V (³ ¡ Tu(³;µ)))g
s.t. b = c ¡ µw + q³
Where the last equality follows, again, from the Principle of Optimality. By construction, if
a0 = ³, the above Bellman equation is the recursive formulation of the decentralized problem
given in De¯nition 1. ¤
The above proposition hinges upon an important assumption: As in Kocherlakota (2005)
and Albanesi and Sleet (2006), I assume that the ¯scal implementation is such that the14 PONTUS RENDAHL
optimal allocation is \a®ordable". A®ordability means that if the agent had the possibility
to buy the optimal allocation, she would period-by-period a®ord it. That is,
wµt + at ¡ Tt = ct + q(ptbe;t+1 + (1 ¡ pt)bu;t+1)
This restriction is crucial for separating the e®ect of savings and taxes on consumption.
A®ordability implies that the government's state variable, bt, must equal the agent's non-
labor cash-on-hand at ¡ Tt. As a consequence, taxes are strictly redistributive
at+1 = (pt(at+1 ¡ Te;t+1) + (1 ¡ pt)(at+1 ¡ Tu;t+1)) (21)
By Lemma 3, it is thus immediate that bu;t+1 > at+1 > be;t+1. The agent is consequently
positively taxed when employed and negatively taxed when unemployed (or equivalently,
receiving an unemployment bene¯t).
When savings and taxes are identi¯ed as above, the intuition underlying Proposition 1
is quite straightforward. Bellman's Principle of Optimality reveals that savings, a0, is a
su±cient state variable for the choice of be, bu and p. The tax functions are then de¯ned
as the di®erence between savings and the optimal t + 1 non-labor cash-on-hand, be and
bu. By the design of the tax function, the agent can always choose the assigned allocation.
Any other feasible choice amounts to imitating the t + 1 allocation of some other agent.
By construction, imitating someone else is incentive compatible and budget feasible. Thus,
since the allocation is optimal under incentive compatibility and budget feasibility, imitation
cannot be optimal.
The tax functions in Proposition 1 are recursive in an agent's wealth, her current and
previous employment state. Akin to the tax functions that map savings to state contin-
gent cash-on-hand, functions be(b;µ) and bu(b;µ) map period t resources to period t + 1
state contingent cash-on-hand. Why, then, could the tax functions not be recursive in
(b;µ)? Inasmuch the optimal allocation still would be attainable for an agent operating in
the decentralized economy, choosing the allocation would no longer be optimal: Imitating
someone else is feasible, but not incentive compatible. By the same logic underlying the
inverse Euler equation, the agent would, then, increase savings to equalize equation (18),
violating the incentive compatibility of the optimal allocation.
Remarks. There is a continuum of tax systems that may implement any incentive fea-
sible allocation. To appreciate this, consider an arbitrary incentive feasible allocation at
time t. The agent consumes c and she exerted search e®ort in the previous period inducing
p¡1. Her asset position and unemployment bene¯t handouts equal a and ¿, respectively.
Then another allocation with a0 = a+², ¿0 = ¿ ¡² and c0 = c, is still incentive compatible,
feasible, and generates the same level of utility to the agent for any real value of ". AtASSET BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 15
one extreme, 100% wealth- and labor taxes with lump-sum transfers equal to consumption,
would indeed implement any allocation. Arguably, such a tax system is quite draconian
and does not resemble the combined usage of taxes and markets to reallocate resources
observed in most current economies. At another extreme, zero taxes and individually and
quantitative-contingently priced Arrow securities could be designed to exactly mimic the
problem in (10)-(12). While perhaps elegant, and by construction optimal, such a market
arrangement requires an elaborate pricing system relying on common knowledge of individ-
ual asset positions and preferences.
Ruling out such elaborate asset structures and focusing on the one bond scenario, one
may, alternatively, view the problem of indeterminacy as a question regarding savings.
Speci¯cally, it is a question regarding whether it is the government, or the agent (or any
combination of the two), that carries out the intertemporal allocations of resources. Of
course, inasmuch there really are a continuum of possible arrangement of storage, one may
legitimately wonder on what basis one can rationally chose between those arrangements.
As in Kocherlakota (2005) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006), this paper imposes two assump-
tions in order to identify the e®ect of self-insurance from taxes/bene¯ts on consumption.
First, agents save using a riskless bond. The presence of a riskless bond can be thought of
as a parsimonious representation of a more elaborate underlying diversi¯ed portfolio choice
(at the intertemporal price q). Second, the optimal allocation is assumed to be period-by-
period a®ordable. Fundamentally this assumes that all intertemporal transfers of resources
are actualized by the agents' savings. This identi¯cation scheme guarantees to attain the
optimal allocation with minimal governmental interference.
3.2.2. Characterization. While taxes has been shown to have a simple recursive represen-
tation, so far little has been shown regarding their properties. Examining the qualitative
properties of the tax function T corresponds to examine how T = a¡b responds to a change
in a. To this end, I will derive and exploit the properties of the marginal tax functions.
This section will state the main results, supported by brief comments. In the subsequent
section, I will relate the results presented here to properties of a \weighted" Euler equation,
and, in turn, relate this equation to the inverse Euler equation. For clarity of exposition,
focus is put on the case (of interest) at µ = 0. To facilitate notation, let Te(a0) and Tu(a0)
denote period t + 1 taxes at the associated employment states at µ = 0.
Proposition 2. If V (b;µ) is concave, there exist marginal tax functions given by
T0
e(a0) = 1 ¡
u0(cu)
pu0(cu) + (1 ¡ p)u0(ce)
; T0
u(a0) = 1 ¡
u0(ce)
pu0(cu) + (1 ¡ p)u0(ce)
Proof. See Appendix A. ¤16 PONTUS RENDAHL
The idea behind the proof is to consider an in¯nitesimal change in a0. The resulting
marginal change in taxes must be such that the government's ¯rst order conditions hold,
incentive compatibility is preserved and the budget balances. In addition, the agent's





e(a0)) + (1 ¡ p)u0(cu)(1 ¡ T0
u(a0)))
Combining the marginal taxes in Proposition 2 with the inverse Euler equation in (15)
gives
T0




u(a0) = 1 ¡
qu0(c)
¯u0(cu)
If ¯ = q, and since ce > c > cu, it is evident that T0
e(a0) < 0 and 1 > T0
u(a0) > 0. Thus,
both unemployment bene¯ts and \reemployment taxes" are decreasing with the agents asset
position.
Corollary 1. Marginal taxes are expected to be zero.
Proof. When the agent is unemployed Proposition 2 together with the inverse Euler equation
(15), gives the result.
When the agent is employed, taxes satis¯es a0 = °(a0 ¡ Te(a0)) + (1 ¡ °)(a0 ¡ Tu(a0)).
If taxes are di®erentiable, the derivative of this expression with respect to a0 gives the
result. ¤
Zero expected marginal taxes are not particularly surprising in this setting; by the con-
struction of the tax functions, taxes are always expected to be zero. A ceteris paribus change
in savings mimics the action taken by some other agent and taxes respond accordingly.
The main part of the literature on optimal unemployment insurance has concluded that
bene¯t payments ought to decrease along the duration of unemployment. The result is intu-
itive; in the absence of savings, a decreasing bene¯t pro¯le induces a decreasing consumption
pro¯le, providing both insurance as well as su±cient search e®ort incentives. Abstracting
from savings, Lemma 3 con¯rms this result. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 shows that this re-
sult does not immediately generalize to a setting in which partial self-insurance is present:
The tax policy is time-invariant and thus independent of the duration of the unemploy-
ment spell. In addition, the following proposition reveals that the intuition supporting a
decreasing bene¯t pro¯le fails in the current setting. Indeed, along the duration of the
unemployment spell, the agent will decumulate assets and the sequence of unemployment
bene¯ts will observationally be increasing.
Proposition 3. If V (b;µ) is concave and ¯ = q, then (i) a > a0, (ii) Tu(a) > Tu(a0), and
(iii) Te(a) < Te(a0).ASSET BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 17
Proof. By Proposition 2, 1 > T0
u(a0) > 0. Thus for any a1 and a2, such that a1 > a2,
Tu(a1) > Tu(a2). If a0 ¸ a, 1 > T0
u(a0) implies that bu ¸ b, which contradicts Lemma 3,
part (iii). Thus a > a0, Tu(a) > Tu(a0) and, by Proposition 2, Te(a) < Te(a0). ¤
The result is intuitive. During unemployment, the agent exploits the insurance e®ect of
savings by decumulating assets. Proposition 2 infers that unemployment taxes are positively
related to the agent's asset position. Thus, as the agent's level of assets decline, so does the
level of the tax. Since unemployment taxes are negative this implies that unemployment
bene¯ts will increase.
Accompanied with the inverse Euler equation, Proposition 3 has an intuitive explanation.
First, wealth has a ¯rst order insurance e®ect. The higher is an agent's wealth, the less she
needs to worry about loss of consumption if she loses her job. Second, in order to provide
incentives to exert search e®ort, the government wishes to generate a positive correlation
between consumption and employment. When the agent's utility function is concave, a
higher level of savings makes it costlier for the government to induce such a correlation and
the agent's search e®ort decreases. By generating a negative correlation between savings
and unemployment bene¯ts, the government manages to mitigate the distortionary e®ect
of savings on search.
3.3. The Euler equation, taxes, and the inverse Euler equation. I now provide a
deeper intuition underlying some of the results presented in the preceding sections. To
this end I will consider an equivalent version of the government's problem in which the sole
choice is strictly intertemporal, and not state contingent. It will be shown how this problem
formulation leads to a \weighted Euler equation", and further how these weights relate to
marginal taxes. At the optimum, the weighted Euler equation implies the inverse Euler
equation.
The inverse Euler equation can be thought of as the outcome when savings are chosen to
balance two con°icting forces: To maximize utility, resources should be allocated to where
the marginal bene¯t of resources is relatively high. For incentive compatibility, resources
should be allocated to states in which the marginal bene¯t of resources is relatively low.
Since incentive compatibility in°icts with period t + 1 resources only, it is thus optimal
relegate a relatively high degree of resources to period t consumption. As a result, the
agent appears savings constrained.
For a given value of savings, it is instructive to think of the optimal division of period
t+1 resources across employment states as functions ful¯lling two restrictions: The incentive
compatibility constraint and the budget constraint. Similar to the tax functions explored in
the previous section, these functions then allocate, for a given level of savings, resources to
the di®erent employment states. Let the government choose savings, a0, and let the functions18 PONTUS RENDAHL
±e(a0) and ±u(a0) allocate resources between employment states such that the budget is
balanced and incentive compatibility holds. That is, for a given p, a0 = p±e(a0)+(1¡p)±u(a0)
and v0(p) = ¯(V (±e(a0)) ¡ V (±u(a0))).
The government then faces the following intertemporal maximization problem
V (b) = max
a0 fu(b ¡ qa0) + ¯(pV (±e(a0)) + (1 ¡ p)V (±u(a0)))g






e(a0) + (1 ¡ p)V 0(bu)±0
u(a0)) (22)
Equation (22) resembles a standard Euler equation, and has an interpretation in terms
of marginal intertemporal trade-o®s: The utility cost of an marginal increase in savings
equals its feasible marginal utility gain. As with standard intertemporal problems, the t+1
feasible marginal utility gain is determined by the feasible in°ow of resources in period t+1
- a marginal decrease of period t consumption is accompanied by a proportional marginal
increase of period t+1 resources, weighted by the interest rate: 1 = p±0
e(a0)+(1¡p)±0
u(a0).
In addition, however, there is a further restriction on how the period t + 1 resources must
be divided between employment states. In order to leave p unaltered, a marginal incentive
compatibility constraint must hold
V 0(±e(a0))±0
e(a0) = V 0(±u(a0))±0
u(a0)
One can combine this marginal incentive compatibility constraint with the \marginal budget








pV 0(bu) + (1 ¡ p)V 0(be)
(23)
The expressions above reveals an important feature: Whenever V 0(bu) > V 0(be), ±0
e(a0) >
±0
u(a0), and vice versa. That is, for states in which the marginal value of resources is
relatively high, the marginal in°ow of resources should be relatively low. Substituting the
relationship in (23) into (22) gives the inverse Euler equation.
It is important to note that the functions in (23) are directly related to the marginal
taxes derived in Proposition 2. Speci¯cally, ±0(a0) = 1 ¡ T0(a0). The intuition underlying
the shape of the tax function then becomes evident: For a certain choice of p to remain
incentive compatible, an increase in savings must be divided between employment states
such that the incentive compatibility constraint holds. That is, the in°ow of resources
must be relatively high at states in which the marginal value of resources is relatively low.
By Lemma 3, the marginal value of resources is high in the unemployed state, and theASSET BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 19
additional in°ow must therefore be low. Since the optimal policy is recursive in an agent's
wealth, a higher level of assets must induce a lower level of unemployment bene¯ts.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied a model of optimal redistribution policies in which the foremost
risk in an agent's life is unemployment. Moral hazard arises as job search e®ort is unob-
servable. The model permits agents to self-insure by means of a riskless bond.
In contrast with previous studies in the literature, it is shown that the optimal unemploy-
ment insurance policy does not display any duration dependence. Whereas wealth encodes
the agents' relevant employment status history, the insurance policy is time-invariant and,
instead, contingent on the agents' asset position. In order to induce job search e®ort, the
government wishes to provide a positive correlation between consumption and employment
status. Since a higher level of savings reduces the correlation, unemployment bene¯ts relate
negatively to wealth. The agents decumulates assets over the unemployment spell in order
to exploit the intrinsic insurance e®ect of wealth. Thus, the sequence of bene¯t payments
is, observationally, increasing with the duration of unemployment.
The policy implications from the analysis are stark; unemployment bene¯ts should be
asset based and relate negatively to wealth. As wealth itself encodes insurance possibilities,
the negative relation between wealth and unemployment bene¯ts is intuitive. However, asset
based approaches have commonly been criticized for its distortive, and negative, e®ect on
savings (e.g. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), Gruber (1998)). Although undesirable
per se, this paper has revealed an additional e®ect of wealth; a higher level of savings reduces
the opportunity cost of being employed and thus increases the unemployment duration.
Together, the net distortive e®ect of an asset based scheme appears to be favorable.
There are several ways in which an asset based unemployment insurance programme
could be accomplished. As with Medicaid, food stamps, and until recently, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC), to mention a few social policies in the United States,
unemployment bene¯ts may be asset based means tested; that is, unemployment bene¯ts
are paid only if an agent has assets below a speci¯ed maximum amount. Alternatively, and
obviously, schemes may be more elaborate with a continuous decline in bene¯t payments
as assets increases.20 PONTUS RENDAHL
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Lemma 2.
Proof. Equations (8) and (9) are repeated for convenience:
V (b0;µ0) = u(c
¤



















The proof proceeds in three steps: First it will be shown that for any utility maximizing or resource minimiz-
ing allocation, the Inada-conditions on u(c) implies that if ct(b0;µ
t) = 0, then ct+s(b0;µ
t+s) = 0, for s > 0,
almost surely (¸(b0;µ
t+s)-a.s.). Second, focusing on the interior case, it will then be shown that b
¤(µ1), as
given in equation (A2), is resource minimizing under the value V (¾
¤;b
¤(µ1);µ1). Third it will be shown
that duality holds; that is if b
¤(µ1) is resource minimizing under V (¾
¤;b
¤(µ1);µ1), then V (¾
¤;b
¤(µ1);µ1) is
utility maximizing under b
¤(µ1) - that is, V (¾
¤;b
¤(µ1);µ1) = V (b
¤(µ1);µ1).
Step 1. For any utility maximizing or resource minimizing allocation, de¯ne ±(b0;µ
t) as
±(b0;µ
t) = u(ct) ¡ v(pt) + ¯(ptu(c
1
t+1) + (1 ¡ pt)u(c
0
t+1))
The dependency of ct, pt and ct+1, on (b0;µ
t) and (b0;(µ
t;µt+1)) is here left implicit. Assume that ¸(b0;µ
t) >
0. Consider the following problem
max
x;z;y
fy ¡ q(px + (1 ¡ p)z)g
s.t. ±(b0;µ
t) = u(ct ¡ y) ¡ v(pt) + ¯(ptu(c
1





t+1 + x) ¡ u(c
0





ct ¸ y; c
1
t+1 ¸ ¡x; c
0
t+1 ¸ ¡z
where the allocation fct;ptg
1
t=0 is incentive feasible. At the optimal allocation, the solution to the above
problem is given by x = y = z = 0. To see why, notice that any deviation of x, y, and z from zero, ful¯lling
the above restrictions, is feasible and incentive compatible. Moreover, such a perturbation frees up period t
resources equal to y ¡q(px+(1¡p)z). These additional resources may, if properly discounted, be allocated
as period zero consumption - or, in a resource minimizing setting, as less period zero resources - without
in°icting with incentive compatibility.
Assume that ct = 0. Then the ¯rst order necessary conditions to the above problem with respect to x, y


















0(0) = 1, c
1
t+1 must also equal zero whenever pt > 0. The same holds for c
1
t+1 whenever (1¡pt) > 0.
Thus if ct(b0;µ
t) = 0 for any µ
t with ¸(b0;µ
t) > 0, then ct+s(b0;µ
t+s) = 0, ¸(b0;µ
t+s)-a.s.ASSET BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 23
Step 2. Consider the problem of choosing sequences ct : V £ £
t ! R+ and pt : V £ £
















s.t. V (¾;V0;µ0) ¸ V0 (A5)
fptg
1
t=0 = argmaxfV (¾;V0;µ0)g; 8 (b0;µ0) 2 B £ £ (A6)
Where V0 = V (¾
¤;b
¤(µ1);µ1) from the utility maximizing solution in (A1). If the constraint in (A5) is
non-binding, then c0 = 0 and, by Step 1. above, ct(V0;µ
t) = 0 8 µ
t. I will henceforth refer to this solution as
the zero solution. It is important to note that a non-zero solution attains at least as high utility as the zero
solution; at any non-zero solution, the agent could exert the same search e®ort as at the zero solution (which
is zero), and attain a strictly higher level of utility. Thus, independently of c0 being interior, constraint (A5)
must hold as an equality.
Could b
0 in (A4) take on a smaller value than b
¤(µ1) in (A2)? If so, there exist a b
0(µ1) such that
V (b
0(µ1);µ1) = V (¾
¤;b
¤(µ1);µ1) 8 µ1 2 £ and b
0(µ1) < b
¤(µ1) for at least one value of µ1. At this alternative
allocation, p
¤
0 is still incentive compatible and
V (b0;µ0) = u(c
¤
0(b0;µ




















Where the last inequality together with monotonicity of V (b0;µ0) implies thus that ¾
¤ could not have at-
tained the maximum in (5).
Step 3. In order to complete the proof, it must be shown that V (¾
¤;b
¤(µ1);µ1) attains the maximum
value under resources b
¤(µ1).
Assume that V (b
¤(µ1);µ1) > V (¾
¤;b
¤(µ1);µ1). By Berge's Maximum Theorem (Aliprantis and Border,
1999), V (b
¤(µ1);µ1) is continuous in b. Since any non-zero solution renders greater utility than the zero
solution, c1(b
¤(µ1);µ1) > 0, and there exist a b
¤¤(µ1) arbitrarily close to b




¤¤(µ1);µ1) > V (¾
¤;b
¤(µ1);µ1). This contradicts that b








Proof. The proof is direct and derives the implied marginal taxes from an in¯nitesimal change in assets.
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Substituting the relationships be = a
0 ¡ Te(a
0) and bu = a
0 ¡ Tu(a
0) into (16) (the government's ¯rst order








Where ¸ and ¹ are the multipliers on the budget and incentive compatibility constraint, respectively. Sub-






















































Using equation (15) and solving equations (A7




0) = 1 ¡
u
0(cu)




0) = 1 ¡
u
0(ce)
pu0(cu) + (1 ¡ p)u0(ce)
¤